T E L E G R A P H
Cypher War Department
Washington City,
July 10---2.P.M. 1864
Lieut. Gen. Grant
City-Point, Va
Your despatch to Gen. Halleck, referring to what I may think in the present emergency, is shown me. Gen. Halleck says we have absolutely no force here fit to go to the field. He thinks that with the hundred day-men, and invalids we have here, we (may possibly but not certainly) can defend Washington, and scarcely Baltimore. Besides these, there are about eight thousand not very reliable, under Howe at Harper's Ferry, with Hunter app-roaching that point very slowly, with what number I suppose you know better than I. Wallace with some odds and ends, and part of what came up with Ricketts, was so badly beaten yesterday at Monocacy, that what is left can attempt no more than to defend Baltimore. What we shall get in from Penn. & N.Y. will scarcely [be] worth counting, I fear. Now what I think is that you should provide to retain your hold where you are certainly, and bring the rest with you personally, and make a vigorous effort to destroy the enemie's force in this vicinity. I think there is really a fair chance to do this if the movement is prompt. This is what I think, upon your suggestion, and is not an order.
A. LINCOLN
Washington City,
July 10---2.P.M. 1864
Lieut. Gen. Grant
City-Point, Va
Your despatch to Gen. Halleck, referring to what I may think in the present emergency, is shown me. Gen. Halleck says we have absolutely no force here fit to go to the field. He thinks that with the hundred day-men, and invalids we have here, we (may possibly but not certainly) can defend Washington, and scarcely Baltimore. Besides these, there are about eight thousand not very reliable, under Howe at Harper's Ferry, with Hunter app-roaching that point very slowly, with what number I suppose you know better than I. Wallace with some odds and ends, and part of what came up with Ricketts, was so badly beaten yesterday at Monocacy, that what is left can attempt no more than to defend Baltimore. What we shall get in from Penn. & N.Y. will scarcely [be] worth counting, I fear. Now what I think is that you should provide to retain your hold where you are certainly, and bring the rest with you personally, and make a vigorous effort to destroy the enemie's force in this vicinity. I think there is really a fair chance to do this if the movement is prompt. This is what I think, upon your suggestion, and is not an order.
A. LINCOLN
This particular telegram sent by President Lincoln, one of nearly 1,000 sent by him during his presidency, is an ideal example of the benefit of the telegraph to the Union. Lincoln now had the power to participate actively in the war through communication and keep the multiple branches of his army tied together. In this transcript, Lincoln informs General Ulysses S. Grant of the current situation of the troops near Washington D.C., based on another report from General Halleck.
Unlike previous presidents during wartime, Lincoln was well informed and proactive in the course of the events occurring outside of his White House. Although the true boom of telegraph use started toward the end of 1861, by the time of the war’s end in 1865, hundreds of telegraph lines weaved throughout the Union, helping the vast realm stay connected and collectively defeat the Confederacy.
Unlike previous presidents during wartime, Lincoln was well informed and proactive in the course of the events occurring outside of his White House. Although the true boom of telegraph use started toward the end of 1861, by the time of the war’s end in 1865, hundreds of telegraph lines weaved throughout the Union, helping the vast realm stay connected and collectively defeat the Confederacy.
"July 10, 1864 (2)." Wiki. Lincoln Wiki, n.d. Web. 06 Dec. 2013. Lee, John K. "The Lincoln Telegrams Project." The Lincoln Telegrams. N.p., n.d. Web. 06 Dec. 2013. <http://lincolntelegrams.com/telegrams/64-07/July10_1864_2_A.jpg>